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Two critical questions about intergenerational outcomes are: one, whether significant bar-
riers or traps exist between different social or economic strata; and two, the extent to which
intergenerational outcomes do (or can be used to) affect individual investment and consump-
tion decisions. We develop a model to explicitly relate these two questions, and prove the
first such ‘rat race’ theorem, showing that a fundamental relationship exists between high
levels of individual investment and the existence of a wealth trap, which traps otherwise
identical agents at a lower level of wealth. Our simple model of intergenerational wealth
dynamics involves agents which balance current consumption with investment in a single
descendant. Investments then determine descendant wealth via a potentially nonlinear and
discontinuous competitiveness function about which we do not make concavity assump-
tions. From this model we demonstrate how to infer such a competitiveness function from
investments, along with geometric criteria to determine individual decisions. Additionally
we investigate the stability of a wealth distribution, both to local perturbations and to the
introduction of new agents with no wealth.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
An important question about income distributions is the degree to which the income of a person
depends on the income of their parents. Typically, modeling intergenerational outcomes is done
either in models comparing relative outcomes in terms of quartiles, deciles or percentiles, or in
more detailed economic models that price labor and capital. An example of the first would be
using bi-stochastic matrices to model the probability that children born to parents in one quartile
of the income distribution become a member of a different quartile [4]. Examples of the second
type are models that predict wealth distributions with heavy tails [1], micro-founded models that
explicitly model individuals, a single firm and tax policies [2], and elegant models of intergener-
ational choices with complete dynamic programming solutions [5]. While bi-stochastic matrices
could seemingly apply to all societies, they are unable to capture the extent of inequality between
quartiles. Meanwhile, the complexity of having to explicitly model economic forces typically
limits the generalizability of micro-founded models. In contrast, we propose a moderately gen-
eral model that can capture relative wealth differences and requires only qualitative modeling of
economic forces and policy.
One benefit of a micro-founded model is it can capture how income distributions might affect
investment decisions. Indeed, the ability of a person to improve the outcomes of their children is
one of the fundamental incentives for a person to work or invest during their own lifetime. Such an
observation is occasionally used in popular discourse to argue against estate or inheritance taxes.
While the above arguments clearly rest upon a number of important empirical questions, they also
involves a logical trade-off between effort/investment and intergenerational mobility. In order to
investigate the extent to which effort and/or investment can be induced through positive intergen-
erational outcomes, we construct a multi-generational model with rational actors conducive to the
argument that intergenerational rewards compel effort and investment.
Our model will include agents in multiple non-overlapping generations, where each agent has
an endowment and dedicates a portion of that endowment towards the outcome of their offspring
(as measured by the offspring’s endowment) while consuming the remainder. Specifically, agents
use a Cobb-Douglas utility function to balance the benefit of their immediate consumption with
the endowment outcome of their offspring[6]. We assume the endowment outcome of children is
a monotonic function, T , of their parent’s investment in them, but make no further assumptions on
its shape. Notice, this allows for models where the offspring’s outcomes have increasing marginal
3returns on parental investments, consistent with a world where the rate of return to capital grows
with assets, as appears to be the case [3, 5, 10]. In the limit of large populations, we prove
that there is a fundamental trade-off between extreme levels of effort and mobility. Namely, we
show that regardless of the shape of T , there is a limit on parental investment, such that if any
agent invests more than this limit, then there must exist some lower level of endowment that an
otherwise identical agent’s dynasty would be forever trapped below. Interpreting the extra effort
of investment above this limit as indicative of a ‘rat race’ and the presence of intergenerational
immobility between different strata as a ‘wealth trap’ allows for this theorem to be restated as ‘the
existence of a rat race implies the existence of a wealth trap’.
We propose this model as a more general framework through which to investigate the funda-
mental trade-offs between different intergenerational outcomes, the effects of social policy and
how these combine to determine income distributions. We also briefly mention how this model
can make sense of some political stances and demonstrate that this model has some interesting
behavior relevant for some notions of meritocracy.
II. AN INTERGENERATIONAL MODEL
Consider discrete generations j, where between generations we assume, for simplicity, that
each member of the society i is replaced by a single descendant. We denote the proportion of total
resources, income and/or status of an individual i during generation j abstractly as endowment
wi, j ∈ R+.
We assume that each individual can impact their descendant’s competitiveness through gifts,
investments in education, bequests, or other efforts, which we represent as a fraction xi, j ∈ [0,1]
of their own endowment. Whatever is not invested in a descendant is consumed. We describe
the trade-off between consuming (1− xi, j)wi, j and investing wi, jxi, j using a Cobb-Douglas utility
function:
ui, j(xi, j) = ((1− xi, j)wi, j)1−αi(wi, j+1(wi, jxi, j))αi, (1)
where wi, j+1 is the observed or anticipated endowment of i’s descendant in generation j+1, and
αi ∈ (0,1) determines i’s trade-off between these terms. In equations where all terms belong to
the same generation, we will generally omit the subscript j.
How wi, j+1 depends on the investment wi, jxi, j determines the dynamics. During any genera-
tion, i’s endowment can be expressed as proportional with i’s competitiveness, Ti, j, and the total
4endowments available to generation j, Wj, so that wi, j = WjTi, j/∑k Tk, j. If the society is non-
discriminatory and the same opportunities for intergenerational investment are available to all,
then Ti, j+1 = Tj(xi, jwi, j). In principle, wi, jxi, j, the argument of Ti, j, captures the extent of re-
sources invested in a child’s raising and education and/or those gifted to the child; while the value
of Ti, j(wi, jxi, j) determines the proportion of Wj+1 that i’s descendant eventually acquires.
The form of Ti, j(y) can capture many different dynamics: for instance if Ti, j(y) = y, then one
assumes that an endowment invested in a child exactly linearly increases the child’s endowment; if
Ti, j(y) = c for a constant c then the endowment of a child is completely independent of the parent’s
endowment or investment; whereas a curve such as Ti, j(y) = y(1+ 14 tanh(y)) has inheritances with
increasing rates of return.
A. Further Assumptions
We assume that the primary components of relative competitiveness depend less on capital than
on a complex interaction of human instruction, mentoring and hierarchical status, that have costs
which generally track economic growth. For example, many of the inputs for human capital such
as: tuition at universities and elite primary and secondary schools, and medical care are common
examples of Baumol’s cost disease in that their costs have tracked or exceeded, sometimes greatly,
per capita economic growth. Thus, we assume that understanding the relative differences in in-
come can be achieved in a model where Tj(y) = T (
y
W j
). In such a situation, we simplify the system
without losing any dynamics by assuming that Wj = n, the fixed population size. Even when this
assumption on the determinants of relative competitiveness is not appropriate, the equilibrium
analysis in this paper is still useful as a way of discussing properties of the current distribution and
competitiveness function T .
Investigating situations where Tj and Wj are functions of ~x and ~w is naturally interesting. In-
deed, under some assumptions of Wj and Tj, there is a tension between maximizing the longterm
utility and the stability of the income distribution, while under other assumptions such a tension is
not present. While intriguing, such questions are beyond the current scope of this paper.
Assuming that Wj = n and that Tj = T now allows us to focus on the shape of the competi-
tiveness function T . Indeed, the shape of T determines how different levels of intergenerational
investment determine future competitiveness, and the shape is a concise summary of how eco-
nomic, political and social systems inside a society determine and apportion outcomes. Further,
5and as we shall see, the shape of T determines the overall stability or instability of a given income
distribution. We assume only that T is non-decreasing and continuous. Indeed, in many potential
societies the relative payoffs may depend on complex interactions or discrete cutoffs. For exam-
ple, the benefits of an expensive private school may be significant, but available only to those with
sufficient means.
B. Rational behavior
As standard, we consider the scaled logarithm of the utility function in eqn. 1 and omit con-
stants, yielding:
Ui, j(xi, j) = ln(1− xi, j)+Ai ln(T (xi, jwi, j))−Ai ln
(
∑
k
T (wk, jxk, j)
)
, (2)
for Ai = αi1−αi ∈ (0,∞). When T (wi, jxi, j) << ∑k T (wk, jxk, j), such as when the population is very
large, then the term Ai ln
(
∑k T (wk, jxk, j)
)
does not significantly impact rational individual deci-
sions. Thus, in the large population limit, rational maximization of the utility function implies that
xi, j is a function of wi, j, denoted as function gA(wi, j):
xi, j = gAi(wi, j) = argmaxx∈[0,1]
[
ln(1− x)+Ai ln(T (xwi, j))
]
.
For some functions T , it is possible to analytically calculate x. For example, if the transfer
function is T (y) = y and the population is homogenous with Ai = A for all i, then in the large pop-
ulation limit xi, j = AA+1 and wi, j+1 =wi, j, implying that the income distribution exactly reproduces
itself.
More generally, in a large uniform population, T (y) = yk leads to a unique solution: xi, j =
kA
kA+1 and
wi, j+1
wk, j+1
= (
wi, j
wk, j
)k. Thus, an entity in control of the shape of T could, by increasing k,
compel efforts arbitrarily close to 1. However, for k > 1, the ratio of wealth in one generation is
exacerbated in the next. Thus, for k > 1, this transfer function inevitably results in a winner take
all income distribution, where a single individual claims virtually all the endowment[7].
For more general T (y), one can determine the equilibrium strategy graphically via Lagrange
multipliers. For some endowment wi, consider the level sets of utility C = lnwi + ln(1− xi)+
Ai ln(T (xiwi)), which is achieved by T Ai(xiwi) = e
C
wi(1−xi) =
C2
wi(1−xi) . The optimal xi is thus the
value of xi at the intersection between the curves T Ai(xiwi) and C2wi(1−xi) for maximal C2, as illus-
trated in Figure 1. Since T is not assumed to be concave, then it is possible for the system behavior
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FIG. 1. The optimal effort xi corresponds the maximal value of C2 such that the curve I(y) = C21−y intersects
T A(wiy), where the value of y at that intersection is the optimal effort. For different endowments, the
relevant portion of the transfer curve changes, altering the optimal efforts. Complicated functions T lead
the dynamics to be discontinuous when multiple levels of effort give the same utility.
to have discontinuities when several levels of effort appear equally good, as in Figure 1. If T and
gi are differentiable, then it must also be the case that dT
Ai
dx =
eC
(wi−wixi)2 , leading to the useful fact
that at rational xi:
T ′(wixi)
T (wixi)
=
1
Ai(wi−wixi) , (3)
which constrains the shape of the T .
III. WEALTH TRAPS AND MERITOCRACIES
An important notion of stability for a wealth distribution is the stability of the distribution to
sudden shocks to individual agents, or somewhat equivalently, the addition of new agents with very
small endowments[8]. In other words, if a member of the population, i, suffered an exogenous
catastrophe that destroyed almost all of i’s endowment, wi → δ , for some 0 < δ << 1 (or if i
immigrated into the system with only a small initial endowment δ ) would the descendants of i
eventually recover, reproducing the original distribution, or would the descendants of i be trapped
in some lower social strata? We formalize such a situation as a wealth trap:
Definition III.1 (Wealth Trap). An equilibrium in the large population limit has a wealth trap at
parameter value A0 if, after adding new agent i with Ai = A0, wi,0 = ε ε > 0 there exists agent k,
Ak = Ai = A0 such that lim j→∞wi, j < wk, j
For example, consider a stepwise transfer function with T (y) = 0.01 for y < 0.5 and T (y) = 1
7for y ≥ 0.5 with egalitarian distribution wi = 1 and corresponding xi = 0.5 for all i. Notice that
this system is locally stable to small perturbations in wi, since the optimal strategy is always to
invest exactly wixi = 0.5. However, this system has a wealth trap, since any person with wealth
less than 0.5 is unable to attain investment 0.5 and instead achieves only 1/100th the endowment
of the remaining population for all time thereafter.
In contrast, the transfer function T (y) =
√
y and the egalitarian endowment distribution wi = 1
with uniform Ai does not have a wealth trap. Indeed, as discussed earlier, endowments converge
like wi, j+1wk, j+1 =
√
wi, j
wk, j
.
Notice that the definition of a wealth trap is specific to agents with the same parameter values
of αi. In fact, it is possible to have a situation where there is a wealth trap for agents with some
parameters but not for their differently parametrized peers, as in Figure 2.
A somewhat related notion is that of a meritocracy, which approximately sorts endowments wi
according to investment appetites αi :
Definition III.2 (Meritocracy). An equilibrium in the large population limit is a meritocracy with
respect to α if and only if for all i and k, αi ≤ αk implies wi ≤ wk
Notice that the above definition of meritocracy applies to particular equilibria and not to a
system more generally. In fact, for a given distribution of αi and a choice of T , there can be subtle
differences between the possible equilibria such that some equilibria are meritocracies while others
are not. A potentially unfortunate side-effect of defining meritocracies for equilibria, as opposed
to for systems, is that it is possible for meritocratic equilibria to have wealth traps[9]. However, as
we see in the next theorem, there remains a relationship between wealth traps and meritocracies.
Theorem III.3. In the large population limit and at some equilibrium, if there are no wealth traps,
then the population is a meritocracy with respect to α .
Proof. If the system were not a meritocracy, then there exists i and k such that αi≤αk but wi >wk.
However, since there are no wealth traps, then i must be able to recover from a shock that reduces
wi to wk, but since αk ≥ αi, then xk(wk) ≥ xi(wi) and thus k must grow along with i’s recovery,
implying that k was not initially at equilibrium, a contradiction.
Clearly, though, any equilibria with a wealth trap neighbors equilibria where two identical
individuals are on opposite sides of the trap, seemingly implying that the system is not a meritoc-
racy (though in the large population limit, moving individuals changes the distribution on a set of
measure zero).
8FIG. 2. A system of agents with parameter αi distributed uniformly at random with the above transfer
function (left), has an equilibrium that sorts agents into two intervals of wealth (right). Namely, agents with
the highest and lowest values of αi are naturally sorted to the lower and upper classes, while there exists a
wealth trap for agents with intermediate values of αi, they can be found in either class.
An important feature to remember about meritocracies is that it is not the case that if wi >
wk then xi > xk. Namely, meritocracies with respect to α do not necessarily award endowment
according to effort x. Indeed, equilibria in which xi ≥ xk implies wi ≥ wk would form a different
type of meritocracy and may be worth future study. In any case, all equilibria clearly have the
property that if wi > wk then wixi > wkxk.
IV. EFFORT AS A FUNCTION OF ENDOWMENT
Policy arguments occasionally set as their aim a specific shape of the effort function gA(w).
However, not all shapes of gA(w) are possible, as we shall see in this section by momentarily re-
versing our perspective: rather than taking T as granted and determining from it the effort function
gA(w), we assume the effort function is known and attempt to infer T . This inference will allow
us to to determine the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of T for a given gA(w). We
will show that there are only two limitations to the shape of a piecewise differentiable g(w): the
first limitation is that total investment, wg(w), is non-decreasing in w; the second limitation is that
g′(w) is Lipshitz continuous at all w where g′ exists. These two conditions allow for the slope of
T to be integrated, thus creating a suitable T that is unique to within rescaling. Integrating T is
also useful in situations where g can be empirically estimated.
9Lemma IV.1. For any transfer function T and some value of A, investment wgA(w) is non de-
creasing as a function of w.
Proof. Suppose that at two endowments, w1 and w2, have w1g(w1) = y1 and w2g(w2) = y2. For y1
to be optimal at w1, it must be that if for some c1, T A(y1) = c1w1−y1 and T
A(y2)≤ c1w1−y2 . Similarly,
there is c2 such that T A(y2) = c2w1−y1 and T
A(y1) ≤ c1w2−y1 . Manipulating these two inequalities
implies that w2−y1w2−y2 ≤
w1−y1
w1−y2 and thus (y2− y1)(w2−w1) ≥ 0, implying that y2 > y1 only if w2 ≥
w1.
That wg is non-decreasing implies that g(w0) ≤ limw→w+0 g(w) and, subsequently, that about
any w0 there is an interval on which g(w)< 1− ε for ε > 0.
Next, consider how to integrate T (y) at points where g(w) is differentiable. Notice that since
at any w there exists c such that, T A(wg(w))) = cw−wg(w) and tangency at this point gives that
AT A−1 dTdy (wg(w)) =
c
(w−wg(w))2 , then,
d
dw
T (wg(w)) = (g(w)+wg′(w))
dT
dy
(wg(w))
=
c(g+wg′)
A(w−wg)2T A−1
=
T (wg)
A
(g+wg′)
(w−wg)
Since wg(w) is non decreasing and g(w) < 1− ε , T can be integrated forward or backward and
is non-decreasing. Further, if g′ is Lipshitz continous everywhere, then ddwT (wg(w)) is as well,
implying that T is unique to within scaling.
Discontinuities in g(w) represent points when there are two levels of investment that return
equal utilities. Thus, if there is at some w0, limw→w−0 g(w) = x
− and limw→w+0 g(w) = x
+ where
x− 6= x+, then for some c limw→w−0 T
A(wx−) = cw0−w0x− and limw→w+0 T
A(wx+) = cw0−w0x+ . Thus,
(1− x−) limw→w−0 T
A(wx−) = (1− x+) limw→w+0 T
A(wx+), allowing for the integration to be con-
tinued. In such a scenario, notice that T (y) can assume any value less than cw0−y between w0x
−
and w0x+, and thus preclude uniqueness in T , though in a completely non-consequential manner.
V. RAT RACES IMPLY WEALTH TRAPS
While with different choices of T it is possible to compel any level of effort less than 1, greater
levels of effort eventually imply the existence of a wealth trap. Indeed, as we will show in this
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section, this tradeoff between effort and intergenerational mobility is described by the following
theorem:
Theorem V.1. For a fixed transfer function T , if at equilibrium and in the large population limit
there exists an agent i such that xi > αi, then there exists a wealth trap for those with parameter
α = αi.
If we colloquially refer to exertion above αi as a ‘rat-race,’ then theorem V.1 implies that a
rat-race implies a wealth trap (or a ‘rat-trap’). Indeed, if the common notion of a rat-race is of a
person toiling with little time for leisure, aware that falling behind in the rat-race would leave them
and their descendants left forever behind, then this theorem seems entirely consistent with that
depiction. We provide the necessary but rather tedious details to extend this theorem to potentially
discontinuous gA(w) in the appendix.
In order to simplify the following statements, we change variables from endowment w to z =
lnw, the order of magnitude of an endowment. Similarly, we let g¯(z) = g(ez), and at equilibrium
we denote γ = W∑k T (wk, jxk, j) so that wi, j = e
zi j = γTi, j in the large population limit.
of theorem V.1 for differentiable g. Assume to the contrary that there are no wealth traps and en-
dowment level z∗ achieves gA(z∗) =αi+ε = AA+1 +ε for some ε > 0. We will arrive at a contradic-
tion by attempting to integrate the inter-generational rate of return, ri, j =
wi, j+1
xi, jwi, j
, backwards from
z∗ without producing a wealth trap. As we integrate backwards, we will establish two facts: first,
g¯(z) remains at or above AA+1 + ε; second, either r(z) decreases or g¯(z) increases as z decreases.
It will thus follow that while integrating backwards, one of two things must inevitably happen:
either gA(z) exceeds its bound of 1, or r becomes less than 1, implying a wealth trap.
The condition that the system is at equilibrium at z∗ implies r(z∗) = wiwig¯(z∗) =
1
g¯(z∗) ≤ A+1A+ε(A+1) .
Further, whenever r(z) ≤ A+1A+ε(A+1) , then g¯(z) ≥
w j+1
w j
( AA+1 + ε) >
A
A+1 + ε , provided there are no
wealth traps. Thus,
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∂ r
∂ z
=
d
dz
T (ezg¯(z))γ
ezg¯
= γ(1+
g¯′
g¯
)
(
dT
dy
− T
ezg¯
)
= γT (1+
g¯′
g¯
)
(
c
AT A(ez− ezg¯)2 −
1
ezg¯
)
= γT (1+
g¯′
g¯
)
(
1
Aez(1− g¯) −
1
ezg¯
)
= r
1
1− g¯(1+
g¯′
g¯
)
(
A+1
A
g¯−1
)
≥ ε(1+ g¯
′
g¯
)
Since ddze
zg¯(z) = ezg¯+ ezg¯′ ≥ 0, then lemma IV.1 also implies that g¯′g¯ ≥ −1, implying that the
factor (1+ g¯
′
g¯ ) ≥ 0. Thus, at any z < z∗, either g¯′ = −g¯ or ∂ r∂ z > 0, and integrating from z∗ to −∞
leads to either g¯ > 1 or r < 1 at some z, either one a contradiction.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have shown that in any large fixed society where intergenerational outcomes determine ef-
fort according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function, extraordinary levels of effort imply a wealth
trap. For any single transfer function T , this relationship may seem obvious, but the result estab-
lishes the same bound for all possible shapes of a fixed T . Thus, no amount of clever redesigning
of T can maximize efforts above αi while avoiding the disegalitarian properties of a wealth trap.
While the results of this paper are specific to the model, the more abstracted point likely gen-
eralizes: that encouraging work with increased rewards eventually becomes synonymous with
encouraging work with an implicit threat of someone being ‘left behind.’
Of course, as is with models, many of the assumptions are somewhat naive. An assumption
worth considering is that T , to the extent that such a function even exists, is surely not fixed in
time. Indeed, policy that changes T , such as subsidies/funding for education, inheritance tax rates,
social insurance, etc., are some of the most politically contentious issues and regularly change
within a single generation. Ironically though, that these issues are so frequently debated only
increases the need for theoretical frameworks with which to gauge claims of their effects, and we
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believe equilibrium analysis remains useful for this task.
Specifically, this model allows us to readily observe the likely arguments of different people
throughout the income distribution. Clearly, every person i has self-interested reasons to argue for
increasing T (yi) and decreasing T at all other values. However, while the self-interest is apparent,
any political arguments for changing T must necessarily be made in a way that try to appeal to
rest of the population (or at least a majority). Our model assumes T is known, but that the total
endowment function, W (~x,~w) is not, therefore the natural way to structure arguments is to argue
about the shape of W around the current values of~x, ~w. We briefly discus how these self-interested
arguments may be structured at different endowment levels below, and we note that they appear at
exactly as one expects and they are the same as or similar to existing arguments.
Individuals near the top of the endowment distribution with endowments w+ = maxk wk have
naturally self-interested arguments to claim that the marginal impact of effort, δWδx , is large. Argu-
ments that δWδx are large, such as claims that classes of people do not work enough, suggest that the
curvature of T should be increased so as to induce larger choices of x, and integrating this change
over all of T necessitates a large increase to T (w+g(w+)). Notice that this line of reasoning would
be particularly critical of welfare, or public services, which leads to T (0)> 0, since any non-zero
intercept leads x(0) = 0. A complementary argument to the focus on xi is that W is sensitive to
increasing xiwi, and thus increasing xi for the well endowed is particularly important. These argu-
ments are precisely the set of arguments that claim that a tax on inheritance, or taxes in general,
decrease savings beyond what is optimal.
The above arguments are centered on claims of large partial derivatives of W and are thus
ultimately arguments framed around Pareto improvements and greater rates of growth. Regardless,
the self-interested arguments of the well-endowed inevitably and unsurprisingly push T towards
greater inequality. Notice that while there is no natural limit to the extreme values of x for the above
argument, theorem V.1 gives that this line of argumentation has a fundamental limit, beyond which
inducing greater effort leads to discreet and immobile classes.
Meanwhile, although much of this model was explicitly designed to explain the possible argu-
ments of the well-endowed, natural arguments are available to the rest of the endowment distribu-
tion.
The first such argument is that δWδx is small or negative. In particular, if the primary problem
facing the society were a lack of aggregate demand, then not only would W increase, the total social
utility, which depends on ∑k(1−αk) log(wk), would be increased by decreasing the curvature of
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T , reducing xi. Similarly, utilitarian concerns more generally support reducing T (y) for large y
and increasing it for small y, especially very small y.
Notice that since the above arguments for flattening T are likely distributional, only for very
negative values of δWδx would they be a Pareto improvement.
As has been observed before, those that claim that the principle goal of analysis should focus
solely on Pareto gains will be biased towards the self-interested arguments of the well-endowed
and biased against the arguments of the lesser-endowed.
The above analysis assumes that the natural division of interests are between those above some
endowment threshold (e.g. the median income) and those below it. It is worth considering whether
there could be a natural politics of the middle class, where the middle had natural economic cause
against a coalition of the well- and lesser-endowed. The answer is, of course, that such a division
is possible, but requires either a more complicated argument about W or perhaps more naturally
represents balancing the above arguments.
Ultimately, this model of intergenerational mobility is able to support class-based arguments,
which is probably not a difficult feat, but remains interesting nonetheless.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proved the first of hopefully many ‘rat-race’ theorems, which establish a
fundamental connection between extraordinary levels of effort and distributional issues. Clearly,
important questions can be addressed by extending the model developed in this paper as well as
proving similar theorems in completely new models.
In terms of extensions of the model developed in this paper, adding noise to the model, such
that T (y) provided the mean of some distribution of outcomes rather than the deterministic out-
come, would be a natural direction for future work. Depending on the variance in a stochastic
setting, deterministic wealth traps could be anything from barriers that a dynasty might eventually
overcome, barriers that require exponential time to overcome, to completely inconsequential fea-
tures in a system governed by the stochastics. Determining at what levels of noise the appropriate
summary of the system ceases to be the deterministic one presented here would be an important
accomplishment. It would also be interesting to determine, when fitting a distribution, how much
leeway exists between stochastic parameters and the deterministic parameters governing T .
Another potential direction for future research is to begin to include other heterogeneities into
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the population. Currently the model can accommodate a notion of meritocracy based upon an in-
tergenerational discounting rate, α , but including individualized competencies would be a natural
way to expand the model. Ultimately, in this an other settings, we hope that this paper furthers and
broadens the examinations into the connections between income mobility and social policy.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Linear stability
Here we derive several useful formulas. First, we use the fact that T
′
T =
1
Ai(w−wgi(w)) to find how
investment decisions change with w.
∂g(w)
∂w
=−Uxw
Uxx
=− Axw(T T
′′−T ′2)+AT ′T
−T 2(1−g)−2+Aw2T ′′T −Aw2T ′2
=− g
w
+
1
w(1+ 1A −Aw2(1−g)2 T
′′
T )
This implies that the change in total investments follows:
∂ (wg(w))
∂w
= wg′(w)+g(w)
=
1
(1+ 1A −Aw2(1−g)2 T
′′
T )
.
Further, since investment cannot fall with endowment, this quantity must be positive, and thus
T ′′
T <
A−1
A2(w−wg(w))2 , which is the same condition that T
A has a smaller second derivative than a
curve of constant Utility.
This equation can then be used in the equations for linear stability. If gi and T are differentiable,
the standard linear stability of an equilibrium is given by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian with
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entries:
∂wi, j+1
∂wi, j
= γT ′(wi, jgi(wi, j))
(
wi, j
∂gi
∂w
(wi, j)+gi(wi, j)
)(
1− wi, j
Wj
)
=
γA(1− wi, jW j )T T ′
T +TA−A2w2i, j(1−gi(wi, j))2T ′′
∂wk, j+1
∂wi, j
= γT ′(wi, jgi(wi, j))
(
wi, j
∂gi
∂w
(wi, j)+gi(wi, j)
)(
−wk, j
Wj
)
=
−γAwi, jW j )T T ′
T +TA−A2w2i, j(1−gi(wi, j))2T ′′
Since total endowment changes are zero-sum, column sums add to zero. Naturally, this implies
a zero eigenvalue corresponding to the neutrally stable perturbation, which enriches everyone so
that the same distribution recreates itself. For the special case of fully egalitarian distributions,
where wi = wk for all i and k, the Gershgorin circle theorem implies that the equilibrium is stable
if γT ′(wi, jgi(wi, j))
(
wi, j
∂gi
∂w (wi, j)+gi(wi, j)
)
< 1.
B. Proving theorem V.1 for discontinuous g¯
Note that first, in considering more general g¯, we need not worry about z where g¯(z) is contin-
uous but not differentiable, as wherever g¯ is continuous so is r and the monotonicity of T implies
that such points occupy a set of Lebesgue measure 0. Thus, points where g¯ is continuous but not
differentiable cannot affect an integration of g¯ or r.
Finally, we first investigate how r changes with z at discontinuities of g¯(z) when r < A+1A . In
order to extend the proof in the main body, we need to show that for decreasing z, discontinuities
in g do not prevent the previous contradiction; either r decreases below 1 or x increases past 1. As
we will show, discontinuities in g¯ cannot increase r, and while they can decrease g¯, they cannot do
so without also changing T A.
Proof. Consider some point z0 such that limz→z0− g¯(z) = x0 and limz→z0+ g¯(z) = x1, where 1 <
r(z0)< α−1 and x1 > α .
First, we show that x0 > AA+1 . Since x0 and x1 are both optimal, then there exists some c such
that T A(x1w) = cw(1−x1) and T
A(x0w) = cw(1−x0) . Manipulating these equations and the assumption
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that r = γT (x0w)x0w <
A+1
A and w≤ γT (x1w) yields:
x0 = 1− cwT A(x0w)
= 1− w(1− x1)T
A(x1w)
wT A(x0w)
> 1− w
A
γAT A(x0w)
(xA1 (1− x1))
(
A+1
A
)A
≥ 1− xA1 (1− x1)
(
A+1
A
)A
The minimum of this quantity is x0 > AA+1 , which is attained when x1 =
A
A+1 .
To see that r0 < r1, consider:
r0
r1
=
γT (x0w)
γT (x1w)
x1w
x0w
=
x1(1− x1) 1A
x0(1− x0) 1A
.
Since xA(1−x) is decreasing for x > AA+1 , then AA+1 < x0 < x1 implies r0 < r1. Thus, if g¯ has only
a finite number discontinuities or if g has an infinite number of discontinuities but g¯′ > −1 and
thus drdz > 0 on a set of infinite measure, these discontinuities do not prevent integration eventually
leading to g(w)> 1 or r < 1.
In contrast, consider the scenario where g¯ has an infinite number of discontinuities, drdz > 0 on
a set of finite measure and g¯′ =−1 almost everywhere else. In order for g¯ =−1 on an infinite set
but g¯ > 0 always, then there must be an infinite number of discontinuities of g¯(wk) such that the
∑k g¯(w+k )− g¯(w−k ) = ∞. However, notice that at any discontinuity of g¯:
T A(wx1)−T A(wx0) = c
(1− x1) −
c
(1− x0)
=
c
w
x1− x0
(1− x1)(1− x0)
≥ c
w
(A+1)2(x1− x0)
Thus, T A decreases at least proportionally to g¯ as z is integrated backwards, implying that if
∑k g¯(w+k )− g¯(w−k ) = ∞, then limy→0 T A(y) =−∞ contradicting the fact that T > 0.
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